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Use of Closed Circuit Television 
A
lthough child sexual abuse occurs 
frequently, such cases are difficult 
to prosecute. The child is usually 
the only witness to the crime. Corroborat-
ing physical evidence, if any, may be in-
conclusive. 1 Children are often found in-
competent to testify. Ifa child does testify, 
he or she may be easily confused by cross-
examination and unable to recall crucial 
details or relate them to the jury. Cur-
rently, there are three types of statutes 
aimed at reducing the burden that the ju-
dicial system places on the child witness. 
Child hearsay statutes and videotape stat-
utes have been most prominent. The third 
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type, testimony via closed circuit television, 
has recently been enacted by the Maryland 
legislature in an effort to strengthen the 
prosecution's case in child abuse actions 
while protecting the child victim from fur-
ther trauma. 
This article will evaluate the Maryland 
closed circuit television statute by concen-
trating on the confrontation clause and 
other constitutional guarantees that may 
be offended. Because of its recent passage, 
the Maryland statute's constitutionality has 
not yet been tested. Since there are no sim-
ilar statutes,2 it is necessary to analogize it 
to the child hearsay and videotape statutes. 
Part I of this article describes the difficul-
ties faced in prosecuting a child abuse case. 
Part II discusses the hearsay rule which 
limits the admission of out-of-court state-
ments. Parts III and IV consider child 
hearsay and videotape statutes as well as 
the decisions of state courts with respect to 
such statutes. Part V discusses the Mary-
land closed circuit television statute and 
current case law concerning closed circuit 
testimony. Part VI addresses the Maryland 
statute and other constitutional guaran-
tees. In part VII the writer concludes that 
the Maryland statute is constitutional. 
for Victims of Child Abuse 
I. The Child Witness in 
Sexual Abuse Cases 
Children are reluctant witnesses.3 A 
child may retract a true report of sexual 
abuse due to guilt, fear of reprisal or anxiety 
that the offender will be sent to prison. 4 
Child abusers often threaten their child 
victims with violence if the children report 
the abuse. Consequently, a child victim 
may be so frightened by the alleged abuser's 
presence in the courtroom that the child is 
unable to testify rationally. Parents some-
times decline to press charges rather than 
subject their abused children to the ordeal 
of extended litigation requiring repetition 
of a painful and best-forgotten episode.5 
When a child testifies at the trial of his 
accused assailant, he is treated the same 
way as an adult witness.6 Child victims are 
required to testify in the same courts and 
in the same manner as adults. A courtroom 
physically accommodates adults, but not 
younger children, which makes the room 
especially threatening to them. "No spe-
cial judges are appointed to hear child vic-
tims; the court's formal procedures make 
no allowances for their protection, and no 
expert in problems of children's mental 
hygiene is appointed by the state to sup-
port child victims." 7 These procedures 
contrast sharply with those used in the 
case of juvenile offenders who are insu-
lated and kept separate from the system 
that processes adult offenders. 
The child abuse victim who is required 
to testify in court may experience severe 
psychological stress. The trauma of reliv-
ing the past experience can be very damag-
ing to the child. Some commentators have 
suggested that legal intervention in re-
sponse to child sexual abuse often consti-
tutes a second victimization of the child. 8 
The judicial system has not been sensitive 
to the victimization that a child may face in 
the courtroom.9 Consequently, legislators 
have passed legislation aimed at reducing 
the trauma to a child witness. 
II. Hearsay and the 
Confrontation Clause 
Child hearsay statutes create a special 
exception to the hearsay rule for state-
ments made by child victims of abuse, 
enabling a third person to repeat in court 
the child's description of the abusive act. 
Videotape statutes allow the child's testi-
mony to be preserved on videotape for 
presentation to the jury at trial. Maryland's 
closed circuit television statute allows the 
child to testify outside the courtroom and 
the physical presence of the defendant by 
means of closed circuit television. These 
statutes deprive defendants of the oppor-
tunity to confront their accusers face-to-
face before a jury. Arguably, the statutes 
violate the sixth amendment's guarantee 
that" [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right ... to be con-
fronted with the witness against him." 10 
This federal right is binding on the states. I I 
Child hearsay, videotape, and tech-
nically, closed circuit television statutes 
permit the admission at trial of hearsay 
evidence. Hearsay evidence is defined as 
out-of-court statements offered to prove the 
truth of the matter asserted. 12 The hearsay 
rule is related to but not identical to the 
confrontation right. Originally, 
[t]he primary object of the [confronta-
tIon clause of the sixth amendment] 
... was to prevent depositions or ex 
parte affidavits ... being used against 
the prisoner in lieu of a personal exam-
ination and cross-examination of the 
witness in which the accused has an 
opportunity, not only of testing the 
recollection and sifting the conscience 
of the witness, but of compelling him 
to stand face to face with the jury in 
order that they may look at him, and 
judge by his demeanor upon the stand 
and the manner in which he gives his 
testimony, whether he is worthy of 
belief. 13 
The belief is that face-to-face confronta-
tion at trial enhances the truth seeking pro-
cess. Generally, witnesses must be present 
at trial where the defendant is allowed to 
cross-examine them. 14 The jury may thus 
observe the demeanor of witnesses while 
under oath and subject to cross-examina-
tion by the defense. 15 As outlined by the 
Supreme Court, 
confrontation (1) insures that the wit-
ness will give his statement under oath 
- thus impressing him with the seri-
ousness of the matter and guarding 
against the lie by the possibility of a 
penalty for perjury; (2) forces the wit-
ness to submit to cross-examination, 
the 'greatest legal engine ever invented 
for the discovery of truth' ; and (3) per-
mits the jury that is to decide defen-
dant's fate to observe the demeanor of 
the witness in making his statement, 
thus aiding the jury in assessing his 
credibility. 16 
Hearsay statements are found inadmis-
sible because they lack this test of reliabil-
ity.17 If literally applied, the sixth amend-
ment's confrontation clause would bar the 
admission of all hearsay evidence unless the 
out-of-court declarant testified at trial. I8 
Bu.t courts have never interpreted the con-
frontation clause to exclude all out-of-court 
statements. 19 In Mattox v. United States 20 
the Supreme Court ruled that the general 
prohibition of hearsay evidence "must oc-
casionally give way to considerations of 
public policy and the necessities of the 
case." 21 The Court continued by stating 
that "the rights of the public shall not be 
wholly sacrificed in order that an inci-
dental benefit may be preserved to the 
accused." 22 
As the Supreme Court has noted, "[a] 
number of exceptions have developed over 
the years to allow admission of hearsay 
statements made under circumstances that 
tend to assure reliability and thereby com-
pensate for the absence of the oath and 
opportunity for cross-examination." 23 An 
example is the exception for dying dec-
larations. 24 This exception is based on the 
belief that a person facing imminent death 
is prone to speak the truth. 25 
The Supreme Court has found out-of-
court statements admissible when the de-
clarant testifies at trial based on the reason-
ing that the opportunity to cross-examine 
the declarant about the out-of-court state-
ment sufficiently tests its reliability.26 If 
the declarant does not testify, and there-
fore is not present for cross-examination at 
trial, out-of-court statements are admis-
sible only if they meet the requirements es-
tablished by Ohio v. Roberts. 27 The first 
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requirement is that the state must show 
that the declarant is "unavailable." 28 Sec-
ondly, the statement is admissible only ifit 
bears adequate "indicia of reliability." 29 
Reliability can be demonstrated by show-
ing either that the evidence falls within a 
"firmly rooted" hearsay exception30 or that 
it bears "particularized guarantees of trust-
worthiness." 31 
The unavailability requirement rec-
onciles two competing interests. The 
defendant has the right to confront the 
declarant.32 On the other hand, when con-
frontation is not possible, the prosecution 
should be able to present hearsay evidence 
representing competent testimony rather 
than no evidence at all. 33 By demonstrat-
ing unavailability the state justifies frus-
trating the defendant's interest in con-
fronting and cross-examining the witness. 
In child sex abuse cases, certain "firmly 
rooted" hearsay exceptions have been used 
to admit out-of-court statements made by 
the child victim. Most widely used has 
been the "excited utterance" 34 which al-
lows the admission of statements made by 
the child while under the stress of excite-
ment caused by a startling event or condi-
tion. Also used have been "statements 
made for purposes of medical diagnosis or 
treatment." 35 The result, however, has 
been that many courts strain the rationales 
of these exceptions by extending the allow-
able time lapse, and have admitted state-
ments made several hours or even days 
after the event. 36 
If a child is found ''unavailable'' to testify, 
other possible traditional hearsay excep-
tions that have been used include "state-
ments made under belief of impending 
death" 37 and "former testimony." 38 The 
latter exception is the rationale behind 
videotape statutes which permit deposi-
tions of child victims to be presented to the 
jury at trial. Although these exceptions 
have been useful in admitting some state-
ments of child victims, most statements 
are still excluded. 
III. Child Hearsay Statutes 
Eight states39 have enacted hearsay stat-
utes creating a special exception to the 
hearsay rule for statements made by child 
victims of sex abuse. This exception en-
ables the person to whom the child spoke, 
for example, the child's mother or doctor, 
"to repeat in court the child's description 
of the abusive act."40 There are three ra-
tionales generally offered in support of a 
hearsay exception for child reports of sex-
ual abuse. 41 The first is necessity. Neces-
sity is based on the belief that a child is un-
able to testify about such sensitive matters 
and traditional hearsay exceptions do not 
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allow the child's out-of-court statements to 
be admitted. The second finds the child's 
hearsay testimony to be inherently reli-
able. A child's out-of-court statements may 
be more reliable than his actual in-court 
testimony since a child's ability to relate 
events under the pressure of cross-exam-
ination may be limited. 42 The third reason 
is that child victims need to be protected 
from the trauma resulting from courtroom 
testimony. 43 
Washington and Kansas were the first 
two states to pass child hearsay statutes. 44 
The Washington statute applied to a child 
victim under ten years of age. 45 In order to 
find "sufficient indicia of reliability" the 
court must consider the time, content and 
circumstances of the child's statement. If 
the child is unavailable as a witness, cor-
roborative evidence of the act must be es-
tablished. 46 The Kansas statute,47 on the 
other hand, requires that the court find 
that the child victim is unavailable as a 
witness, that the statement is "apparently 
reliable" and the child was not induced to 
make the statement falsely by use of threats 
or promises. 48 
Most of the child hearsay statutes adopt 
the standards of unavailability of the child 
victim as a witness and adequate "indicia 
of reliability" of the statement set forth in 
Ohio v. Roberts for resolving confrontation 
clause challenges to the hearsay rule. 49 
Five of the statutes 50 direct that the court 
should admit hearsay statements only ifit 
finds that the statement is supported by 
sufficient indicia of reliability. All five 
statutes also require that the child testify at 
trial or be found unavailable as a witness. 
If the child is not available to testify, most 
of the statutes require corroboration of the 
abusive act.51 The Illinois statute allows 
testimony by the child that he or she com-
plained of such act to another as well as 
testimony by the person to whom the child 
complained that such complaint was made 
in order to corroborate the child's testi-
mony.52 
Currently under consideration by the 
Governor's Task Force in Maryland is the 
Child Advocacy Model Statute prepared 
by the ABA Resource Center. 53 This stat-
ute involves a proposed hearsay exception 
for a child's statement of sexual abuse. In 
the proposal, if the court finds that specific 
requirements are satisfied, an out-of-court 
statement made by a child under the age of 
eleven years is admissible into evidence in 
any judicial proceeding. The statement 
may be admitted if the child testifies at 
trial, including testimony by closed circuit 
television, or if the child is found unavail-
able. The proposed statute specifically 
states what constitutes unavailability. Un-
availability includes: 
death; absence from the jurisdiction; 
total failure of memory; persistent re-
fusal to testify despite court orders to 
do so; physical or mental disability; 
privilege; incompetency at trial (in-
cluding inability to communicate at 
all about the offense due to extreme 
fear or other similar reason); or sub-
stantiallikelihood of severe emotional 
trauma from testifying in open court 
and in the physical presence of the de-
fendant, jury and public, or trauma 
from testifying by any other means 
including videotaped deposition or 
closed-circuit television. 54 
Another requirement in the proposal, is 
that the statement must possess particu-
larized guarantees of trustworthiness. The 
proposal outlines thirteen factors the court 
may consider in making such a determin-
ation. For example, the declarant's per-
sonal knowledge of the event; certainty 
that the statement was made, including the 
credibility of the person testifying about 
the statement; any apparent motive to lie 
or partiality by the declarant, including in-
terest, bias, corruption, coercion; whether 
more than one person heard the statement, 
etc. Finally, notice must be given to the de-
fendant prior to trial of the prosecution's 
intention to introduce the statement. 
Child hearsay statutes do not violate the 
confrontation clause as long as the child 
victim is available to testify and be cross-
examined at trial. Frequently, however, 
the court finds that the child is unavailable 
to testify because of the child's incompe-
tence55 or medical unavailability. 56 Con-
sequently, the defendant is denied the op-
portunity for cross-examination. One legal 
commentator has stated that a finding of 
unavailability of a child victim as a witness 
is not warranted based on the likelihood of 
emotional trauma nor the incompetency of 
the child since neither makes it impossible 
for the child to testify in courtY On the 
other hand, if a child is so frightened or 
inarticulate to allow any meaningful exam-
ination, a finding of unavailability is justi-
fied since the effect is that relevant testi-
mony is not elicited. In such circumstances, 
the child's hearsay statement should be ad-
mitted if properly corroborated. 
The lack of corroboration of the abusive 
act is a frequent difficulty found in child 
abuse cases. The question is, therefore, 
what constitutes sufficient corroboration 
so that a child's statement may be admitted. 
The Washington Supreme Court has held 
that adequate indicia of reliability of a 
statement made by a child victim of sexual 
abuse must be found in circumstances sur-
rounding the making of the out-of-court 
statement and not from subsequent cor-
roboration of the criminal act. 58 The Wash-
ington Court of Appeals held that the fact 
that the statute requires "corroborative 
evidence of the act" does not fulfill the 
high standard of reliability necessary to 
use the child hearsay exception, since cor-
roboration of sexual abuse alone does 
not lend particular trustworthiness to the 
child's statement regarding the identity of 
the abuser. 59 
IV. Videotape Statutes 
The second method for admitting a 
child's statement of sexual abuse into evi-
dence is by videotape. Thirteen states have 
enacted videotape statutes60 which allow 
the child's testimony to be taken prior to 
trial in the presence of a judge, the defen-
dant, and both attorneys and preserved on 
videotape for presentation to the jury at 
trial. The purpose of these statutes is to 
spare the child repeated appearances in 
court and permit the child to withdraw 
quickly from the judicial process. 61 These 
statutes usually permit cross-examination62 
since most involve the videotaping of dep-
ositions63 or preliminary hearings. 64 
In states that allow videotaped testimony 
to be used in lieu of the child's testimony at 
trial, the statutes require that the defen-
dant be present and that cross-examination 
be allowed during the videotape. 65 All of 
these statutes except Arkansas and New 
Mexic066 require that the court find the 
child unavailable to testify at trial before 
the videotape is admissible. Four other 
statutes67 require that the child victim be 
available to testify at trial before the video-
tape is admissible but allow the testimony 
to be taken outside the presence of both 
prosecution and defense attorneys. These 
statutes require, however, that the person 
conducting the interview must be present 
at the trial and be available to testify or be 
cross-examined by either party. The Wis-
consin statute68 allows the videotape to be 
used in lieu of or in addition to the direct 
testimony of the child at trial. 
Once the videotaped testimony is found 
to be admissible, it is treated as the "func-
tional equivalent of testimony in court." 69 
Videotaped testimony offered later is hear-
say, and the Supreme Court has held that 
prior testimony can be admitted o.nly un-
der the same constraints as other hearsay 
evidence.7o Therefore, under the require-
ments of Roberts, videotaped testimony 
would be admissible only if the child testi-
fied at trial about the testimony or the state 
demonstrated that the child was unavail-
able. 
The Supreme Court has treated past 
testimony as ordinary hearsay in two in-
stances. First, where the defendant had no 
adequate opportunity for cross-examination 
at the earlier hearing,71 and second, where 
the defendant failed to conduct vigorous 
cross-examination and had no way of know-
ing that the witness would not testify at 
trial. 72 On the other hand, most videotape 
statutes allow full opportunity for cross-
examination when the testimony is re-
corded, and the defendant is on notice that 
the videotaped testimony may be used in 
lieu of the child's testimony at trial. At the 
time the testimony is taken, these statutes 
preserve the essential elements of confron-
tation - the oath, the opportunity to ob-
serve the witness, demeanor of the wit-
ness, and the right to cross-examine. 73 
These elements provide "all that the sixth 
amendment demands: 'substantial compli-
ance with the purpose behind the confron-
tation requirement'." 7 4 
The child abuse 
victim who is 
required to testify in 
court may experience 
severe psychological 
stress. 
Arguably, the requirement of direct 
physical confrontation is the least impor-
tant element of the confrontation clause. 
At the time the Constitution was drafted, 
live testimony was the only way that a jury 
could observe the demeanor of a witness. 75 
This element may have been the result 
of the inability to foresee technological 
developments that would permit cross-
examination and confrontation without 
physical presence. The Supreme Court 
has held that "a primary interest secured 
by [the confrontation clause] is the right of 
cross-examination; an adequate opportun-
ity for cross-examination may satisfy the 
clause in the absence of physical confron-
tation."76 
Most courts have admitted videotape 
testimony as evidence even though there 
was no direct physical confrontation at 
trial. In State v. Melendez 77 the Arizona 
Court of Appeals upheld the use at trial of 
a videotaped deposition of a six-year-old 
sexual abuse victim, noting that the defen-
dant and his counsel were present during 
the videotaping and had the right to cross-
examine the witness. 78 Evidence was pre-
sented that the witness, as a result offear, 
would become uncommunicative if called 
to testify before a jury. In holding that no 
prejudice resulted to the defendant, the 
court stated that "the circumstances justi-
fied the trial court's invocation of modern 
technology to meet the special needs of a 
witness and to afford the defendant his 
constitutional right to confrontation." 79 A 
Florida court acknowledged the need to ex-
clude the defendant from a deposition be-
cause of emotional trauma to his child vic-
tim. 80 In Commonwealth v. Stasko 81 the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania approved 
the constitutionality of videotapes, stating 
that the three purposes of the right of con-
frontation (oath, cross-examination, and 
demeanor) are well served by the video-
taped deposition. 
Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals had no objection to the trial 
court allowing videotaped testimony of 
children at trial. 82 In order to relieve their 
apprehensiveness about appearing in court, 
the trial judge and the parties agreed to 
substitute the children's videotape testi-
mony for their live testimony. During de-
liberations, the jury requested permission 
to replay in the jury room the videotaped 
testimony of the children. The Ninth Cir-
cuit found an abuse of discretion in replay-
ing the videotape stating that videotape 
testimony serves as the functional equiva-
lent of a live witness.83 
Videotapes may not faithfully convey 
the witness' demeanor, however, and may 
impede the jury's determination of cred-
ibility. Addressing objections made by the 
defendant in a murder case, the California 
Court of Appeals "concede[d] that testi-
mony through a television set differs from 
live testimony, [but] the process does not 
significantly affect the flow of information 
to the jury. Videotape is sufficiently simi-
lar to live testimony to permit the jury to 
properly perform its function." 84 It found 
that videotape was no less valid or less re-
liable than the reading of a written tran-
script and stated that fair new procedures 
that facilitate proper fact finding are allow-
able. 85 Therefore, generally, videotape 
testimony is admissible when the defen-
dant is given an opportunity to cross-
examine the witness and when the court 
finds that the child is unavailable to testify 
at trial. 
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v. Section 9·102 and the 
Confrontation Clause 
The Maryland legislature has attempted 
to reduce the psychological harm to a child 
victim testifying in a child abuse case 
through the passage in 1985 of Section 
9-102 of the Courts and Judicial Proceed-
ings Article of the Maryland Annotated 
Code.86 The statute allows a judge, under 
certain circumstances, to order the child's 
testimony to be taken outside both the 
courtroom and the physical presence of the 
defendant and shown live by means of 
closed circuit television. Before a child 
may testify in this fashion, the judge must 
first determine that testimony by the child 
victim in the courtroom will result in the 
child suffering such serious emotional dis-
tress that the child could not reasonably 
communicate.87 
While the child is testifying by closed 
circuit television, only the prosecuting at-
torney, the attorney for the defendant and 
the judge may question the child. 88 The 
prosecuting attorney, the attorney for the 
defendant, the operators of the closed cir-
cuit television equipment and any person 
whose presence, in the opinion of the 
court, contributes to the well-being of the 
child may be in the room with the child 
when he testifies.89 During the child's tes-
timony, the judge and the defendant shall 
be in the courtroom. 90 Closed circuit tele-
vision may not be used if the defendant is 
representing himself pro se. 91 
Section 9-lO2 is aimed at easing the 
trauma of a child witness by allowing 
the child's testimony to be taken outside 
the presence of the defendant. Also, it is 
carefully drafted to protect the rights of 
the defendant. A judge may order the tes-
timony of a child victim to be taken out-
side the courtroom and simultaneously 
shown in the courtroom by means of a 
closed circuit television only if he deter-
mines that testimony by the child victim in 
the courtroom will result in the child suf-
fering serious emotional distress such that 
the child cannot reasonably communicate. 
Essentially, the child becomes an unavail-
able witness. The defense attorney is per-
mitted in the room with the child when the 
child testifies assuring a full opportunity 
for cross-examination. During cross-ex-
amination the defendant is able to consult 
with the defense attorney by an appropri-
ate electronic method. 
Because of the absence of the witness 
from the courtroom, closed circuit testi-
mony, as in videotape, may implicate the 
defendant's right to confrontation of wit-
nesses. The Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, in United States v. Benfield,92 
found that the use of a videotape deposi-
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tion of a traumatized adult kidnap victim 
at trial violated the defendant's constitu-
tional right to confrontation. The court 
held that the right of confrontation nor-
mally includes a face-to-face meeting at 
trial at which time cross-examination takes 
place. 93 
In Benfield, the victim developed a psy-
chiatric infirmity following the ordeal and 
her treating psychiatrist indicated that she 
could not be subpoenaed for trial for several 
months. 94 The trial court granted the gov-
ernment's request for a videotaped deposi-
tion and ordered that the defendant could 
be present at the deposition, but not within 
the vision of the victim. During the depo-
sition, the defendant sat in another room 
and observed the proceedings on a monitor. 
He was allowed to stop the questioning by 
sounding a buzzer in order to consult with 
counsel. Counsel was allowed to conduct 
cross-examination. 95 
The court stated that "a videotaped de-
position supplies an environment substan-
tially comparable to a trial; but where the 
defendant was not permitted to be an active 
participant in the video deposition, this 
procedural substitute is constitutionally 
infirm." 96 Recollection, veracity and com-
munication are influenced by a face-to-face 
challenge. The court went on to hold that, 
if narrow in scope, an exception to the 
face-to-face requirement could be based on 
necessity or waiver.97 
Although the holding was rendered in 
the context of a conviction of violation of a 
municipal ordinance, a proceeding civil in 
nature, the court in Kansas City v. McCoy98 
held that the confrontation clause did not 
demand the physical presence of the wit-
ness in the courtroom. In McCoy, the de-
fendant was convicted of a city ordinance 
prohibiting possession of marijuana. The 
court held that the confrontation clause did 
not require that an expert witness giving 
testimony against the defendant be physi-
cally present in the courtroom, and that 
the use of a closed circuit television system 
by which the witness and persons in the 
courtroom were visible and able to hear 
each other, was sufficient.99 The court 
based its decision on precedent which es-
tablished that the requirement of the physi-
cal presence of the witness in the courtroom 
must occasionally give way to considera-
tions of public policy and the necessities of 
the case, 100 and that an adequate opportu-
nity for cross-examination may satisfy the 
confrontation clause even in the absence of 
physical confrontation. 101 
A New Jersey superior court held in 
State v. Sheppard 102 that the use of video-
tapel03 testimony of a ten-year-old abuse 
victim would be permitted, and in an ex-
tended analysis, found that the defendant's 
right of confrontation would not be vio-
lated. The court distinguished Benfield on 
several grounds. It stated that Benfield in-
volved a deposition in which the jury was 
not present to see and hear the actual testi-
mony whereas, here, the jury would watch, 
by means of a monitor in the courtroom, 
the ten-year-old as she testified. In Benfield 
the victim was an adult and not a child. 
Additionally, the defendant in Benfield 
was not charged with sexual abuse. These 
factors convinced the court that the com-
peting interests involved warranted dis-
pensing with confrontation. Since there 
was no curtailment of the right of cross-
examination (the central purpose of con-
frontation), the procedure was upheld. 104 
The fact that closed circuit testimony is 
a live process may enable it to avoid entirely 
some of the challenges leveled against vid-
eotaped testimony. 105 Closed circuit testi-
mony is instantaneous so it permits spon-
taneous examination and cross-examination 
of a witness in the presence of the trier of 
fact. It cannot be edited, as a videotape can, 
and, therefore, offers less likelihood of dis-
tortion as regards both the testimony and 
the demeanor, and hence the credibility of 
the witness. 106 
Testimony offered pursuant to Mary-
land's closed circuit television statute is 
more reliable than the traditional hearsay 
statement introduced into evidence by a 
third person's testimony. Under Section 
9-102, the facts are stated directly by the 
child and are not biased by the views of the 
individual relating the child's statement in 
court. In addition, sixth amendment goals 
are satisfied by cross-examination and the 
opportunity to observe the demeanor of 
the witness, without direct confrontation. 
This statute allows the witness to avoid the 
trauma of courtroom interrogation as well 
as the trauma of confrontation with the 
defendant. 
Section 9-lO2 has not yet been tested by 
the courts. The primary challenge it must 
pass is the confrontation clause. This stat-
ute should pass such a challenge. The pro-
tection of the confrontation clause is not 
absolute. As the Supreme Court held in 
Mattox, "[a] technical adherence to the let-
ter of a constitutional provision may occa-
sionally be carried farther than is necessary 
to the just protection of the accused, and 
farther than the safety of the public will 
warrant." 107 Competing interests may 
warrant dispensing with confrontation at 
trial.I°8 
This statute advances such competing 
interests. It attempts to remedy the diffi-
culties encountered in prosecuting crimes 
in which the only witness is a young child 
sometimes so frightened and traumatized 
as to be unable to communicate. Second, it 
protects young victims from the prolonged 
ordeal of recounting the abusive acts in 
open court. The state holds an interest in 
protecting young children, alleged victims 
of abuse, from the trauma of repeated ap-
pearances and extended testimony in open 
court in the presence of the alleged assail-
ant. Closed circuit testimony does not sig-
nificantly infringe upon the defendant's 
confrontation rights. As long as the defen-
dant can observe the child's testimony and 
can confer with his attorney during cross-
examination, the essential safeguards of 
confrontation are preserved. 
An argument offered in opposition to 
the statutes that permit child victims to 
testify outside the presence of a defendant 
is that of "where will the line be drawn?" 
Arguably, the same interests are involved 
in cases of adult victims of rape, crimes 
against elderly persons, "mob" cases or in 
any such cases in which the victims are se-
verely frightened and may suffer further 
trauma in testifying against their alleged 
assailant. The state should give more pro-
tection to these victims. The response to 
this argument is that the state has a greater 
interest in protecting a child victim. A child 
is more vulnerable than an adult. A child 
has not developed the mechanisms an adult 
has to enable him to cope with the stress 
and pressures involved in prolonged pros-
ecutions. Therefore, greater protection of 
the child victim is justified. 
Prejudice to the defendant is another ob-
j ection made concerning this type of testi-
mony. Such testimony may create the im-
pression that it is "special." This objection, 
however, should be dealt with on a case-by-
case basis. A judge may, in his discretion, 
refuse to admit evidence that is purely 
prejudicial. 109 
Although hearsay, closed circuit testi-
mony would still satisfy the guidelines 
established by Roberts. Before a child may 
testify in this manner the court must, in 
effect, determine that the child is unavail-
able. Reliability may be tested by the jury 
through the observance of the child's de-
meanor while subject to cross-examination. 
Under these circumstances, it is clear that 
closed circuit testimony sufficiently safe-
guards a defendant's confrontation rights 
so as to prevail under such an attack. 
Because the Maryland statute narrowly 
limits the circumstances in which closed 
circuit testimony may be used and preserves 
the critical elements of the trial setting, the 
constitutional rights of the defendant are 
preserved. At the same time, victims of 
child abuse are protected from further psy-
chological harm associated with testifying 
in open court. 
VI. Section 9·102 and other 
Constitutional Guarantees 
Closed circuit testimony may offend other 
clauses of the United States Constitution 
including the public trial and compulsory 
process clauses of the sixth amendment, 110 
the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment,111 and the freedom of the 
press clause of the first amendment. 112 
The compulsory process clause guarantees 
the defendant a "right to put on the stand a 
witness who is physically and mentally ca-
pable oftestifying to events that he person-
ally observed, and whose testimony would 
have been relevant and material to the de-
fense." 113 Thus, defendants have a right to 
call available and competent witnesses on 
material and relevant issues. However, this 
right is not absolute. This guarantee is not 
offended when the witness is unavailable 
including when the witness refuses to tes-
tify.114 A finding of unavailability is re-
quired before the closed circuit television 
is put into operation. 
Most courts have 
admitted videotape 
testimony as evidence 
even though there was 
no direct physical 
confrontation at trial. 
Under the sixth amendment the defen-
dant has a right to a public trial,115 and 
under the first amendment the public and 
press have a right of access to criminal 
trials. 116 Special procedures which protect 
the child witness by limiting access to the 
courtroom may affect these rights. Under 
the Maryland statute, only access to the 
room where the child is testifying is limited. 
The courtroom would still be open to the 
press and public. Moreover, these guaran-
tees are not absolute. A defendant's right 
to a public trial may be curtailed in order 
to protect the psychological well-being of 
victim witnesses. 117 
Due process considerations of "funda-
mental fairness" 118 may be implicated if 
the prosecution is granted advantages or 
options it does not generally enjoy. 119 Due 
process is satisfied, however, if the advan-
tages are related to the need of protecting 
child witnesses and facilitating the fact 
finding process. Closed circuit testimony, 
more so than videotape testimony, is live 
testimony simultaneously shown in the 
courtroom while the witness is testifying. 
VII. Conclusion 
Under Section 9-102, the testimony of a 
child victim may be taken outside the 
courtroom and the physical presence of 
the defendant if the judge finds that testi-
mony by the child victim in the courtroom 
will result in the child suffering such seri-
ous emotional stress that the child could 
not reasonably communicate. The Mary-
land statute narrowly limits the circum-
stances in which closed circuit testimony 
may be used and preserves the critical ele-
ments of the trial setting. As the Supreme 
Court has held, an adequate opportunity 
for cross-examination may satisfy the con-
frontation clause even in the absence of 
physical confrontation. The state's interest 
in protecting young victims of child abuse 
from further trauma and facilitating the 
prosecution of their alleged assailants war-
rants dispensing with the defendant's face-
to-face confrontation when the essential 
elements of his or her confrontation rights 
are satisfied. 
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Johnson v. Mountaire Farms of Delmarva 
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Although the court's decision in Johnson 
is in line with the majority of other state 
holdings, it is at odds with the slowly de-
veloping current trend. In fact, on May 31, 
1985, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
held that §44 of the Act allows an employee 
to hold his employer's insurer liable under 
the theory of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress resulting from the actions of 
the insurer. Young v. Hartford Accident & 
Indemnity, 303 Md. 182, 492 A.2d 1270 
(1985); see also Gallagher v. Bituminous 
Fire and Marine Insurance Company, 303 
Md. 201,492 A.2d 1280 (1985). Johnson 
seems to put an end to any further expand-
ing of the exclusive remedy exceptions un-
der the Act. In Maryland, as in the major-
ity of jurisdictions, without a showing of 
a "deliberate intention" to injure an em-
ployee, an employer will not be held liable 
outside of the Act, no matter how grossly 
negligent he might be. The end result in 
Johnson was that Rodney Adams' estate, 
because Rodney had no dependents, could 
only recover medical and funeral expenses. 
-Stephen A. Markey, III 
u.s. V. 1966 Beechcraft Aircraft: 
COURT UPHOLDS THIRD PARTY 
FORFEITURE UNDER 21 U.S.C. 
§881 
In U.S. v. 1966 Beechcraft Aircraft, 777 
F.2d 947 (4th Cir. 1985), the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit fol-
lowed precedents from the Second, Fifth 
and Eleventh Circuits to hold that the use 
of an airplane to transport conspirators to 
the scene of a drug deal exposes that vehicle 
to forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. §881 (1982). 
The court further held that an airplane 
owned by an uninvolved third party was 
subject to forfeiture because of his "con-
scious indifference." !d. at 952. 
In early 1983, an informant in Greenville, 
South Carolina contacted the Drug Enforce-
ment Agency (DEA) about a possible co-
caine sale. The informant was directed to 
negotiate a buy and a DEA surveillance op-
eration began. The informant arranged a 
deal with Brown and Montgomery to buy 
ten kilograms of cocaine for $500,000. In 
late February, Montgomery flew to Ft. 
Lauderdale, Florida to meet with Gerant 
and Butler, the cocaine suppliers, and 
Coddington, a middleman, to negotiate the 
purcnase. After weighing the cocaine and 
checking its purity, Montgomery flew back 
to Greenville. 
Gerant and Coddington then flew a 1966 
Beechcraft from Ft. Lauderdale to South 
Carolina. There was circumstantial evi-
dence suggesting that the Beechcraft car-
ried the ten kilograms of cocaine. Butler 
flew a 1969 Aerostar from Ft. Lauderdale 
to South Carolina with a passenger, Hanna. 
All parties involved in the deal met at a 
Howard Johnson's and eventually all were 
. arrested, with the exception of Coddington, 
who escaped. In addition to recovering the 
cocaine from an automobile, a search of 
the hotel rooms revealed an electric money 
counter, a microscope, several guns, $4,960 
in cash and a marijuana cigarette. A search 
of the Beechcraft revealed documents in-
dicating that Gerant and Butler were on 
the plane in the Bahamas three months 
earlier. 
Under authority granted by 21 U.S.C. 
§ 881 (b)( 4), law enforcement officers seized 
the two airplanes once it was determined 
they were used to promote the drug trans-
action. Forfeiture proceedings against To-
tal Time Aircraft, Inc., the owner of the 
Beechcraft, and Sundance Air, Inc., the 
owner of the Aerostar, were instituted in 
federal district court. The consolidated 
cases were tried without a jury and the dis-
trict court ruled both aircraft were subject 
to forfeiture. Sundance Air is a Florida 
corporation wholly owned by Gerant. The 
district court determined that by trans-
porting two drug conspirators, Gerant was 
utilizing the corporation's plane to assist in 
the illegal act of selling cocaine. Therefore, 
the Aerostar was used to "facilitate the 
sale, transportation, possession or conceal-
ment of cocaine" which the corporation 
was aware of through its owner and was 
subject to forfeiture. Id. at 949. 
Total Time, is also a Florida corporation 
owned by David and Virgil Seeright. Total 
Time allowed Gerant touse the Beechcraft 
on several occasions, including the trip to 
South Carolina. The district court found 
that the Beechcraft transported the cocaine 
on this particular trip, concluding that it 
was used to further the "sale, transporta-
tion, possession or concealment" of cocaine 
in violation of21 U.S.c. §881(a)(4). It fur-
ther found that David Seeright, the corpo-
ration's president, did not inquire into the 
"purpose of the trip, or what cargo would 
be carried, required no signed contract, 
had no clear understanding as to when the 
plane would be returned, and received no 
money for its use." Id. at 950. In addition, 
a flight plan was not filed and there was no 
insurance on the plane. The district court 
concluded that Total Time did nothing to 
guard against the illegal use of its plane, 
and therefore, was not an "innocent owner" 
within the meaning of the Supreme Court's 
decision in Calero- Toledo v. Pearson Yacht 
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